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Bricks, Mortar, and Google
I.	Introduction

The Internet and the number of people who use it have grown tremendously over
the years. From the use of instant messaging to the emergence of companies like
Google, Inc., the Internet has changed the way that people communicate and conduct
business. In the last decade alone, worldwide Internet use has grown from just over
360 million users in 2000 to over 1.9 billion users in 2010.1 As technology continues
to improve, the number of people who use the Internet, and consume products and
services over the Internet, will likely increase exponentially if past trends are any
indication.
As the Internet grows, “web-based businesses are increasingly [becoming] the
subject of antitrust concerns”2 given the emergence and growth of large Internet
companies such as Google, Yahoo!, eBay, and MySpace, to name a few.3 In his article
Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, David S. Evans4
discusses the development of the web-based economy, and identifies several antitrust
issues that are expected to arise.5 Given that these issues are newly emerging in the
1.

Internet Usage Statistics, InternetWorldStats, http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated
June 30, 2010).

2.

David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
Colloquy 285, 285 (2008); see, e.g., LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. 06-6994, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43739 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2008) (alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of
Internet-based social networking sites, and advertising on Internet-based social networking sites); In re
eBay Antitrust Litig., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (suit alleging tying of online payments
service to transaction service); Person v. Google, Inc., No. 06-7297, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47920 (N.D.
Cal. June 25, 2007) (suit alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of Internet advertising).
In addition to a number of lawsuits filed, in 2007 the Federal Trade Commission investigated the
acquisition of DoubleClick, Inc. by Google, and decided not to block it but expressed an intent to “closely
watch” the markets involved in online advertising. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of FTC Concerning
Google/DoubleClick, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/07
10170/071220statement.pdf. Beyond the United States, there have been claims in the European
Community that Apple, Inc. has violated competition law by limiting the compatibility between its
music players and music purchased from its competitors. See Evans, supra note 2, at 285 n.2.

3.

See Evans, supra note 2, at 286.

4.

David S. Evans is the editor-in-chief of Competition Policy International and chairs the editorial board of
the CPI Antitrust Chronicle. Competition Pol’y Intern’l, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.
com/profile/show/8433 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). In addition, he is:
A specialist on competition policy in the United States and European Union, a topic on
which he has written and lectured extensively, David has served as an expert and
testified before courts, arbitrators, regulatory authorities and legislatures in the United
States and Europe. David is Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School and Visiting
Professor, Faculty of Laws, University College London where he is one of the Executive
Directors of Jevons Institute of Competition Law and Economics. From 1985 to 1995,
he was an Adjunct Professor of Law at Fordham Law School . . . where he taught
antitrust law and economics.

Id. He has also published seven books and seventy articles, many of which are on antitrust topics. Id.
5.

See generally Evans, supra note 2. The issues Evans identifies are “the emergence of impregnable
monopolies,” “leveraging into adjacent markets,” “access to facilities,” “tying and bundling,” and
“envelopment and predation.” Id. at 301–05. Evans describes “impregnable monopolies” as the
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context of e-commerce, many of them have not yet found their way to the inside of a
courtroom. Therefore, it is not entirely clear how courts will view and analyze the
alleged anticompetitive behavior of these new and growing companies, nor is it entirely
clear how courts will define the relevant markets in which these companies operate.
Defining the relevant market is a particularly important aspect of an antitrust
case. The manner in which courts define the relevant market in cases involving
emerging Internet companies will determine whether such companies ultimately face
antitrust liability.6 The definition of the relevant market enables agencies (specifically,
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice) and ultimately the
courts to “discern market power by examining concentration in a defined market.” 7
“In defining the relevant . . . market, court[s] must determine which products
compete with the defendant’s product and thus limit or prevent the exercise of market
power.”8 Therefore, the more broadly a court defines the relevant market, the less
likely it is that the defendant will have the ability to exercise monopoly power in that
market. As a corollary, if the court determines that the defendant does not have the
ability to exercise monopoly power in the market, it is less likely that the defendant
will ultimately face antitrust liability.
Given the importance of defining the relevant market in an antitrust case, this
note attempts to predict how courts will define the relevant market for Internet
companies facing antitrust liability. Part II of this note discusses the history of the
Internet and its growth, and the resulting antitrust problems that are likely to arise.
Part III is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the importance of
defining a relevant market in an antitrust case, as well as the fact that it is not yet
clear how courts will define the relevant antitrust market in cases involving Internet
companies. The second section discusses the framework that courts use for defining
the relevant antitrust market. Part IV predicts how courts will define the relevant
antitrust market for Internet companies by analyzing three different types of Internetbased businesses: advertisers, retailers, and social networking Web sites. This analysis
is based on how courts have begun to deal with defining the relevant market in the
few cases involving businesses in these three categories, as well as how courts have
defined the relevant market in cases involving more traditional brick-and-mortar
businesses.
“monopolization of certain [market] segments.” Id. at 302–03. “Leveraging into adjacent markets” refers
to “dominant firms [seeking] to move into related markets for complementary products or services.” See
id. at 303. An example is Google’s introduction of its Google Checkout payment system to compete
with PayPal. Id. “Access to facilities” refers to issues that may arise from web platforms that close parts
of themselves off. Id. at 303–04. For example, Facebook “does not allow search engines to crawl its web[
]site” and search its content. Id. at 304. “Envelopment and predation” refers to a situation where an
Internet company “crushes” other companies by giving away free features and services that the other
company charges its users for. Id. at 305.
6.

See Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Failure to identify a relevant
market is a proper ground for dismissing a [monopolization] claim.”).

7.

Andrew C. Hruska, Note, A Broad Market Approach to Antitrust Product Market Definition in Innovative
Industries, 102 Yale L.J. 305, 305 (1992).

8.

2–10 Earl W. Kintner et al., Federal Antitrust Law § 10.1 (Supp. 2010).
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II.	The Internet

A. A Brief History

The Internet is a system of global “computer networks that are linked by both
wired and wireless connections that interoperate through standard communication
protocols.”9 “The Internet is at once a world wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism
for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction
between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location.”10
Indeed, the Internet has revolutionized the way that people do business and
communicate with one another, from e-mail to online banking and from online
shopping to even dating.11
The idea for the Internet originated in the early 1960s by MIT professor, J.C.R.
Licklider.12 Licklider referred to his vision as the “Galactic Network,” and pictured a
system of globally interconnected computers that would enable users to access data
and programs at quick speeds from anywhere in the world.13 Originally known as
ARPANET, the Internet was first launched in 1969, and in its early stages was used
by computer experts, engineers, scientists, and librarians.14 At that point, personal
computers did not exist, so those who used the Internet were required to learn an
extremely complex system.15 In fact, ARPANET was comprised of only four
computers at its inception.16
The 1970s was a decade of progress for the Internet, and by 1972 nineteen
additional computers were added to ARPANET, for a total of twenty-three host
computers that formed the backbone of the network.17 That same year, e-mail was
adapted for ARPANET.18 E-mail was regarded as the “killer app” that “changed the
[I]nternet forever” by helping to spread ARPANET in its early days, as well as

9.

Evans, supra note 2, at 287. “A communication protocol is the set of standard rules for data representation,
signaling, authentication and error detection required to send information over a communications
channel.” Communications Protocol Definition, Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.webstersonline-dictionary.org (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).

10.

Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Internet Society, http://www.isoc.org/internet/
history/brief.shtml (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).

11.

See History of the Internet, History of Things, http://www.historyofthings.com/history-of-the-internet
(last visited Oct. 27, 2010).

12.

See Leiner, supra note 10.

13.

See id.

14.

See Walt Howe, A Brief History of the Internet: An Anecdotal History of the People and Communities that
Brought About the Internet and the Web, Walt Howe, http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/history.html
(last updated March 24, 2010).

15.

See id.

16.

See History of the Internet, supra note 11.

17.

See id.

18.

Leiner, supra note 10.
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fueling growth for the future.19 ARPANET soon expanded to Europe and, by 1979,
111 computers were linked to the network.20
The 1980s marked a decade of tremendous growth as technical innovation helped
to bring the Internet closer to what we know it to be today. 21 During this time,
computers became more affordable and became commonplace within universities
and businesses, and ultimately came within the budget of individuals.22 This increase
in computer access led to the development of “many new organizations . . . to help
manage the . . . new users that were utilizing the Internet,” and by the end of 1989
the number of computer hosts on the Internet reached 200,000 from 150 at the
beginning of the decade.23 By the early 1990s, the speed at which information could
be transmitted had increased and the Internet had about 300,000 host computers; by
the end of the decade, the number had reached the hundreds of millions. 24
The commercial web, 25 as we know it today, appeared around “1995 with the
introduction of browsers that made web navigation easier for regular computer
users.”26 “Browsers are necessary to view text and media on the web,”27 and their
introduction encouraged the formation of businesses directed toward mass audiences. 28
As more businesses developed on the web, it became clear that many of their business
models did not enable them to make money. 29 As a result, many of these businesses
lost their market capitalization and disappeared during the bubble burst of 2001. 30
However, the bubble burst did not destroy the web-based economy, and the firms
that emerged created new services and new ways of doing business. 31

19.

History of the Internet, supra note 11. See also Terry W. Posey, Jr., You’ve Got Service!, 28 Dayton L. Rev.
403, 411 (2003) (“[T]he original ‘killer app’ for the Internet was email.”). A “killer app” is “an application
that becomes so indispensable to the way people work that it creates a larger market for the operating
systems and platforms for which it is available.” Id. at 411 n.46 (citation omitted).

20. See History of the Internet, supra note 11.
21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

The Web (short for the World Wide Web) refers to the products and services that rely on the Internet’s
physical communication system. Evans, supra note 2, at 288.

26. Id.
27.

See History of the Internet, supra note 11. The dominant browser today used by Windows computers is
Internet Explorer, although other browsers exist, such as Mozilla’s Firefox, Google’s Chrome, and
Apple’s Safari, to name a few. Id.

28. Evans, supra note 2, at 288.
29. Id.
30. See id.
31.

See id.
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B. The Internet Today and Antitrust

Indeed, the Internet has come a long way from its humble beginnings as an idea
for the “Galactic Network.” Today, in North America, over a quarter of a billion
people, or 77.4% of the population, have access to the Internet.32 As of December
2007, 78% of all Internet users in the United States used webmail, and 39% of United
States users used instant messaging. 33 People can use the Internet to do their
banking, 34 order groceries, 35 purchase books, 36 or even date.37 And, as technology
improves, the number of Internet users is likely to increase. For example, individuals
currently consume Internet products and services mainly through personal computers;
but as more mobile phones around the world become capable of connecting to the
Internet, more people will likely connect more frequently and for longer periods of
time. 38 Given that mobile phones are less expensive and more widely held than
personal computers, this will likely increase not only the consumption of web-based
products and services by current Internet users, but will likely increase consumption
by new Internet users, especially in less-developed countries.39
The growth of the Internet and the number of people who use it has led to the
emergence of “global gargantuan firms . . . which will likely attract scrutiny by
competition authorities.” 40 For example, in the United States, Google has
approximately a 69% share of the online advertising market,41 and eBay has close to
a 100% share of auction page views.42 In fact, some of these “gargantuan firms” have
already come under antitrust scrutiny,43 and further antitrust issues are likely to arise
based upon the probable evolution of the Internet and web-based businesses.44 These
antitrust issues will likely be premised upon anticompetitive behavior stemming from
the alleged monopoly power that these large firms wield in the relevant market.45
32.

Internet Usage Statistics, supra note 1.

33.

Evans, supra note 2, at 289. Worldwide, 69% of Internet users used webmail and 47% used instant
messenger. Id.

34. E.g., Bank of Am., http://www.bankofamerica.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
35.

E.g., NetGrocer, http://www.netgrocer.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).

36. E.g., Amazon, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).
37.

E.g., Match, http://www.match.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).

38. Evans, supra note 2, at 289.
39.

Id.

40. Id. at 286.
41.

See DoubleClick Deal Means Google Controls 69% of the Online Ad Market, Internet Marketing News
(Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.browsermedia.co.uk/2008/04/01/doubleclick-deal-means-google-controls69-of-the-online-ad-market/.

42.

Evans, supra note 2, at 299–300.

43.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

44. See Evans, supra note 2, at 302.
45.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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III.	Defining the Relevant Market

A. The Importance of Defining the Relevant Market

In the United States, many of the predicted antitrust issues will likely arise under
sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act and section 2 of the Sherman Act, as these
statutes deal with unlawful monopolization.46 Under these statutes, courts must
define the relevant market that a firm is alleged to monopolize to determine whether
the firm actually possesses monopoly power.47 The relevant market definition is
significant because if a firm does not possess monopoly power in the relevant market,
it cannot violate the antitrust statutes that proscribe monopolization.
While newly emerging Internet companies may very well raise antitrust concerns,
it is not certain how the relevant antitrust markets in which these companies operate
will be defined. This is due to the fact that courts have not yet had much experience
defining these markets. David S. Evans, the scholar who has predicted many of these
antitrust issues,48 even recognizes that defining the relevant market for these Internet
firms involves some uncertainty. In discussing the large segment shares that some
Internet companies possess, Evans acknowledged that “one can debate whether these
segments correspond to well-defined antitrust markets.”49 Evans also conceded that
the dominant shares held by companies like Google and eBay are only in “putative
46. Section 3 of the Clayton Act states in part that

[i]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to lease or make a sale or
contract for sale of goods . . . or other commodities . . . for use, consumption or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, or fix a
price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in
the goods . . . or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or
seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce.

15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Section 7 of the Clayton Act states in part that “[n]o person engaged
in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital . . . where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Section 2 of the
Sherman Act states in part that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2006 & Supp. 2010).
47.

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“[D]etermination of the relevant market
is a necessary predicate to finding a violation of the Clayton Act, because the threatened monopoly must
be one which will substantially lessen competition within the area of effective competition.”) (quoting
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–410 (1956) (discussing the need to define the relevant
market in cases arising under § 2 of the Sherman Act).

48. See supra notes 4–5.
49. Evans, supra note 2, at 301.
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antitrust markets”50 and “are not necessarily relevant antitrust markets.”51 Given this
uncertainty and the importance of defining the relevant market, this note attempts
to predict how courts will define the relevant antitrust market for web-based
businesses. First, however, it is necessary to discuss the framework courts use for
defining the relevant market.
B. The Relevant Market Framework

The Supreme Court has defined a monopoly as “the power to control prices or
exclude competition.”52 A patent is an example of a classic monopoly because the
patent holder has sole control over the use of his patent, and can exclude others from
using it.53 Conversely, perfect competition54 exists in a market where many buyers
and sellers can freely exchange a standardized product, such as wheat or salt.55
As producers are able to differentiate standardized products in the way of quality,
design, or use, competition diminishes as the producer’s “power over price and
competition of its product” increases.56 Therefore, a seller may essentially have a
“monopoly on [a] certain trade because of location, as an isolated country store or filling
station, or because no one else makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of
his product.”57 In this sense, every seller of a non-standardized product may be
considered a monopolist, since each seller has exclusive control over the production and
price of its product.58 However, this is not what creates an illegal monopoly under the
antitrust statutes; “[i]llegal power must be appraised in terms of the competitive market
for the product.”59 The overall competitive market for a given product depends on how
similar products are to one another and how far buyers are willing to go to substitute
one product for the other.60 Therefore, to determine whether a firm maintains illegal
monopoly power in a market, it is necessary to define the relevant market, which is

50. Id. at 286.
51.

Id. at 286 n.6.

52.

E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 391.

53.

See id. at 392.

54. Perfect competition is “[a] completely efficient market situation characterized by numerous buyers and

sellers, a homogeneous product, perfect information for all parties, and complete freedom to move in
and out of the market. Perfect competition rarely if ever exists, but antitrust scholars often use the
theory as a standard for measuring market performance.” Black’s Law Dictionary 323 (9th ed.
2009).

55.

E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 392.

56. See id.
57.

Id. at 392–93.

58. Id. at 393.
59.

Id. (emphasis added).

60. Id. at 393.
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comprised of the relevant geographic market (how far buyers will travel) and the
relevant product market (how similar products are).61
		

1. Defining the Relevant Geographic Market

		

2. Defining the Relevant Product Market

When examining a market in an antitrust case, courts must define the relevant
geographic market. While the analyses of the geographic and product markets are
distinct, “courts use the same principles in defining the geographic market as they do
in defining the product market.”62 The definition of the relevant “geographic market
encompasses the geographic area to which consumers can practically turn for
alternative sources of the product” involved, as well as the geographic area where “the
antitrust defendants face competition.”63 In determining where consumers can
practically turn for alternatives, and where the defendant faces competition, courts
will look at the “barriers to transactions between buyers and sellers of different
locations,” which include “transportation costs” and the “relative preferences of
consumers with respect to travel and price.”64 Therefore, even if a product or service
is available nationwide, the relevant “geographic market may be confined by the fact
that it can be impractical for consumers to travel great distances to procure particular
services,”65 or by the fact that consumers may be unwilling to travel at all.66
In addition to defining the geographic market in an antitrust case, it is necessary
to define the relevant product market to determine “which products compete with
the defendant’s product and thus limit or prevent the exercise of market power.”67 A
company does not maintain an illegal monopoly over a product simply because its
product is different from other products.68 If this were the case, then “only physically
identical products would be part of the [relevant] market.”69 Therefore, in order to
61.

See Charles Carson Eblen, Defining the Geographic Market in Modern Commerce: The Effect of Globalization
and E-Commerce on Tampa Electric and Its Progeny, 56 Baylor L. Rev. 49, 53 (2004); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (“The ‘area of effective competition’ must be determined by
reference to a product market . . . and geographic market . . . .”) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)).

62. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.15.
63. See Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Morgenstern v.

Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1296 (8th Cir. 1994)).

64. Id. at 228.
65.

Id.

66. See id. A confined geographic market definition may be found to exist in certain service industries

where the service can only be offered from a particular location. Examples of such services include those
provided by banks, hospitals, theaters, and ski resorts. 2–10 Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.15.

67.

Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.1.

68. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956).
69. Id.
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determine the products that comprise a relevant market, the Supreme Court has
instructed courts to look at the products that are reasonably interchangeable with the
product that is alleged to monopolize, as well the products that are viewed as actual
substitutes by consumers.70 In this vein, the Court has noted that the antitrust
statutes do not require that “products be fungible to be considered [part of] the
relevant market”; but at the same time, the definition of substitutes cannot be given
an “infinite range.” 71
When determining whether products are reasonably interchangeable, courts will
define the relevant market to include products that consumers actually view as
substitutes for the defendant’s products.72 Accordingly, courts give weight to actual
consumer purchasing patterns.73 However, courts will also examine the functional
interchangeability of products; that is, the court will look at whether products can
perform the same function, regardless of whether consumers view the products as
actual substitutes.74 Additionally, consumers’ failure to investigate all product sources
does not mean that consumers’ actual purchase patterns necessarily define the
market.75
While it is difficult to provide concrete examples of relevant markets because “[t]
he ‘market’ which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly power
will vary with the part of commerce under consideration,”76 a look at United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.77 may be useful to help contextualize the above
discussion. In E.I. du Pont, the Supreme Court established the doctrinal framework
for defining the relevant product market. The government alleged that E.I. du Pont
had monopolized the market for cellophane.78 The government argued that the
product market was only cellophane, while E.I. du Pont argued that the relevant
product market was all “flexible packaging materials,” which included wax paper,
70. See id. at 394–95 (“What is called for is an appraisal of the ‘cross-elasticity’ of demand in the trade. . . .

In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no
more definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for
the same purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce,’ monopolization of which may be
illegal.”); see also 2–10 Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.1 (“[T]he Court in du Pont looked to 1) ‘functional
interchangeability’ and 2) actual substitution by consumers or ‘cross-elasticity’ of demand.”).

71.

E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 394.

72. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.3.
73. Id.
74.

Id. § 10.2.

75. Id. § 10.3 (citing Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 86 F. Supp. 2d 154, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)) (“All of

[the] choices—whether a particular buyer decides to consider them, or instead ignore all options but
one—must be included in the relevant market.”); Id. (citing Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 514 (3d Cir. 1998)) (“Product market definition turns on the existence of close
substitutes for a particular product, not on the ability of any particular consumer to switch effortlessly to
such substitutes.”).

76. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 404.
77.

Id.

78. Id. at 378.
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aluminum foil, and parchment paper, among other materials.79 The government
asserted that the markets for cellophane and the other packaging materials were
distinct because cellophane and the other materials were neither “substantially
fungible nor like priced.”80 The Court, in holding that the relevant market was all
flexible packaging materials, examined the desirable characteristics of cellophane as
compared to other packaging materials;81 the “degree of functional interchangeability”
of cellophane with the other materials;82 and the “cross-elasticity of demand.”83 With
respect to functional interchangeability, for example, the Court found that “cellophane
had no qualities not possessed by many other materials,” and that, for certain
purposes, cellophane had actually lost a portion of its packaging business to the other
materials.84 In concluding that the relevant market was all f lexible packaging
materials that the Court cited the lower court’s opinion:
The record establishes plain cellophane and moistureproof cellophane are
each flexible packaging materials which are functionally interchangeable with
other flexible packaging materials and sold at same time to same customers
for same purpose at competitive prices; there is no cellophane market distinct
and separate from the market for flexible packaging materials; the market for
flexible packaging materials is the relevant market for determining nature
and extent of duPont’s market control; and duPont has at all times competed
with other cellophane producers and manufacturers of other flexible packaging
materials in all aspects of its cellophane business.85

In addition to examining the availability of substitutes within the broad market,
the Supreme Court, subsequent to the E.I. du Pont case, introduced the concept of
submarkets. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court stated that “within [the]
broad market, well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
product markets for antitrust purposes.”86 The Court went on to note that “[t]he
boundaries of . . . a submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia
as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct
customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.”87
For example, in Brown Shoe, the Court recognized submarkets for men’s, women’s,
and children’s shoes within the broader market of shoes.88 Although the Supreme
79. Id. at 393–94, 423.
80. Id. at 380.
81.

Id. at 398.

82. Id. at 399.
83. Id. at 399–400.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 403.
86. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
87.

Id.

88. See id. at 301.
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Court has acknowledged that submarkets may exist, the Court itself has cautioned
against disregarding the broader market in favor of a relevant submarket,89 and both
lower courts90 and commentators have criticized the idea of submarkets generally.91
IV.	The Internet: How Will Courts Define the Relevant Market?

A. The Geographic Market

When antitrust cases involving Internet companies come before the courts, one
issue that will arise is how the geographic market will be defined. As previously
noted, “[t]he Internet is at once a world-wide broadcasting capability, a mechanism
for information dissemination, and a medium for collaboration and interaction
between individuals and their computers without regard for geographic location.”92
The Internet has no borders, and in a sense, it is everywhere, yet nowhere all at once.
A person in New York and a person in Hawaii can both be on the same Web site, at
the same time, without leaving the comfort of their living rooms. Yet the Internet is
not a physical place where one can say, “I’ll be back in five minutes, I’m going to pick
something up on the Internet.” This unique feature of the Internet presents an
interesting question as to how courts will define the geographic market in which
Internet companies operate for purposes of antitrust analyses.
One possible geographic-market definition for Internet companies is the Internet
itself.93 Such a definition may make sense if the defendant’s product is only available
on the Internet, and cannot be purchased from a brick-and-mortar business. In such
an instance, there is no alternative geographic area in which consumers can practically
acquire the product, nor is there another geographic area in which the antitrust
89. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 549, 553 (1971) (quoting United States v. Phillipsburg

Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970)) (“[S]ubmarkets are not a basis for the disregard of a
broader line of commerce that has economic significance.”).

90. See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.5 n.69 (citing Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l

Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983)).

The use of the term ‘submarket’ is to be avoided; it adds only confusion to an already
imprecise and complex endeavor. For antitrust purposes a product group or geographic
area either meets the listed criteria, in which case it is a relevant market; or it does not,
in which case it is irrelevant for purposes of analysis. No fiddling with nomenclature
will change the analysis or result.

Id.; Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 n.9 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (“‘[T]he
emerging consensus’ of antitrust scholars and [the] case law seems to be that the term ‘submarket’ is
unnecessary.”); In re Air Passenger Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1458
n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (“The term submarket will not be used in this memorandum because the prefix
‘sub’ merely creates confusion and is superfluous.”).
91.

See Kintner, supra note 8, § 10.5 n.70 (citing Lawrence C. Maisel, Submarkets in Merger and
Monopolization Cases, 72 Geo. L.J. 39, 40 (1983)) (criticizing the submarket concept); Id. (citing Robert
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1805, 1849
n.182 (1990)) (arguing that submarkets never had any theoretical justification and created confusion).

92.

Leiner, supra note 10.

93.

See Eblen, supra note 61, at 79.
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defendant faces competition. In this respect, the Internet would seem to satisfy a
geographic-market definition.
However, there are two problems with this approach. First, defining the
geographic market as the Internet raises the glaring issue that the Internet is not a
geographic location, and courts have always required that the geographic market be
defined by geography in cases alleging an unlawful monopoly.94 This is exactly the
holding in one of the only cases to address this issue. In America Online, Inc. v.
GreatDeals.Net, a case involving section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Eastern District
of Virginia refused to define the relevant geographic market as the Internet, stating:
With respect to the relevant geographic market in which competition takes
place, the Court finds that the Internet cannot be defined with outer
boundaries. It is not a place or location; it is infinite. The Internet is a “giant
network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks.” The network “allows any of literally tens of millions of people
with access to the Internet to exchange information.” 95

The court in America Online seemed to suggest that the relevant geographic market
must be a physical place; a place that can be “defined with outer boundaries.”96 The
court also went on to intimate that although the Internet may be “infinite,” the
geographic locations of the individuals using the Internet should be considered in
defining the geographic market.97 Additionally, the court appeared to suggest that
substitute products were available in physical geographic locations,98 which leads to
the second problem of defining the geographic market as the Internet.
The second problem is that brick-and-mortar substitutes for Internet products
and services exist because there will often be businesses in physical, geographic
locations that sell products or services that are possible substitutes for those sold by
Internet companies.99 For the purposes of defining the geographic market, however,
it is sufficient to say that when brick-and-mortar substitutes exist, courts will
undoubtedly need to define the relevant geographic market in a manner that accounts
for the locations of all such substitutes.
94. See id. at 56–59.
95. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting Cyber

Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 456, 459 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).

96. See id.
97.

See Am. Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 858 (“The geographic market may not be restricted to AOL subscribers
not only because there are other persons with access to the Internet, but also because there are other
means of advertising to those persons and to AOL subscribers.”). Given the court’s statement that the
geographic market cannot be restricted to AOL subscribers, or even to people with Internet access, one
may conclude that the geographic location of AOL subscribers and other individuals must be taken into
account when defining the geographic market.

98. See id. at 858 (“There are numerous substitutes for e-mail advertising, some of which are less expensive,

including use of the World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards, television, newspapers, radio, and
leaflets, to name a few.”).

99. These possible substitutes will be analyzed in the next section, which will discuss how courts will define

the relevant product market. See infra Part IV.
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Given that the geographic-market definition will depend on whether brick-andmortar substitutes are available, the product-market definition will likely become
increasingly significant, with the geographic-market definition becoming less
important in the relevant market analysis where Internet companies are involved.
Therefore, the first step in defining the relevant market in which Internet companies
operate will be to define the product market.
When the product market consists of only products or services available on the
Internet, the geographic market will still need to be “defined with outer boundaries”
as a “place or location” in order to actually satisfy a geographic market definition. This
point is illustrated in LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc.,100 where the plaintiff in a
section 2 Sherman Act case alleged the relevant antitrust market to be “Internet-based
social networking in the geographic region of the United States.”101 In discussing the
relevant market, the Central District of California spent most of its time discussing
the product market, and approved the plaintiff ’s geographic market definition as the
United States, as opposed to the entire Internet, in just a few sentences.102
When the product market contains products available from brick-and-mortar
businesses, however, the geographic market will need to be defined in a way that
accounts for these businesses. Therefore, once the product market is defined to
include brick-and-mortar businesses, the geographic market will logically follow and
include the geographic locations of those brick-and-mortar businesses, as those are
locations where consumers can practically turn to purchase substitutes to the products
or services sold on the Internet.103
B. The Product Market

For the purposes of predicting how courts will define the relevant product market
for Internet companies, this note will examine three categories of Internet businesses:
advertisers (i.e., Google and Yahoo!); retailers or companies that sell tangible products
(i.e., eBay and Amazon.com); and social networking Web sites (i.e., MySpace and
Facebook).104 This note predicts that when defining the relevant product market, courts
will define the market broadly for Internet retailers and advertisers to include both
traditional brick-and-mortar business and Internet businesses, but will define the
market narrowly for social networking Web sites to include Internet businesses only.
100. No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43739 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007).
101. Id. at *10.
102. See id. at *16 (citing Am. Online, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 851). For a discussion of how the court defined the

relevant product market, see infra text accompanying notes 137–42.

103. For a further discussion of defining the relevant geographic market, see Eblen, supra note 61, at 53. In

contrast to this note, which discusses how courts should define the relevant antitrust market when
Internet companies are the subject of antitrust scrutiny, Eblen discusses the extent to which Internet
companies should be included in the relevant geographic market where they compete with brick-andmortar sellers when the brick-and-mortar sellers are the subject of antitrust scrutiny. Id.

104. These categories are not intended to be exhaustive, and they are not an attempt to categorize every type

of Internet business. The categories contain some of the largest Internet companies in existence, and
will help to illustrate how courts may go about defining the relevant antitrust market.
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1. Advertising

There are various ways to advertise on the Internet, ranging from search
advertising to banner advertising to pop-up advertisements.105 One possible way to
define the relevant product market for Internet advertising is to divide the different
forms of online advertising into submarkets. This is essentially the approach the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) took during a 2007 investigation of the proposed
acquisition of DoubleClick, Inc. by Google.106 While the FTC did not explicitly
define the submarkets it believed to exist, its official statement from the investigation
revealed that the FTC nevertheless contemplated several submarkets in its
consideration of the relevant market based upon advertisers’ willingness to substitute
one form of online advertising for another.
First, the FTC’s investigation found that advertisers purchase advertising space
online in two ways: they purchase advertising space from search engine providers,
such as Google, and from web content providers.107 Within the category of purchases
from web content providers,108 the FTC discussed two channels through which
content providers sell advertisements—direct and indirect sales.109 With direct sales,
content providers use their own sales force to sell advertisement space, and with
indirect sales, content providers use advertisement intermediation firms to place
advertisements on the content provider’s Web site.110 The FTC’s investigation found
that advertisers do not consider advertising intermediation to be a substitute for
directly placed advertising.111
The FTC also discussed contextual advertising, which is an advertising channel
used by certain advertisement intermediation firms.112 The FTC found that
advertisers do not consider contextual advertisements to be substitutes for directly
purchased advertisements. At the same time, the FTC found that contextual
advertisements do not constitute a separate market, but are part of a broad market
comprised of all advertisements sold by intermediaries.113
105. See Marshall Brain, How Web Advertising Works, How Stuff Works, http://www.howstuffworks.com/

web-advertising.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).

106. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC File No. 071-0170, Statement of Federal Trade Commission

Concerning Google/DoubleClick, 3 (2007) [hereinafter FTC Statement], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf.

107. Id.
108. A content provider is “[a]n organization or individual that creates information, educational or

entertainment content for the Internet . . . .” Content Provider Definition, PCMag, http://www.pcmag.
com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=content+provider&i=40275,00.asp (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).

109. FTC Statement, supra note 106, at 3–4.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 5. “Contextual ad[vertisement]s are predominantly text ad[vertisement]s that are delivered to a

web page using technology that scans the text of a web page for key words and delivers ad[vertisement]s
to the page based on what the user is viewing.” Id.

113. Id. at 5–6.
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While the FTC discussed different forms of online advertising and the purchasing
behavior of advertisers, it did not explicitly state that certain forms of online
advertising comprised distinct submarkets. The FTC, nevertheless, made it clear
that it did not consider all forms of online advertising to be a part of the same relevant
product market:
It has been suggested that the [acquisition of DoubleClick by Google] . . .
would eliminate competition . . . in an “all online advertising” market that
would include search advertising, ads sold through intermediaries, and
directly sold ad inventory. The evidence, however, indicates that all online
advertising does not constitute a relevant antitrust market. Advertisers
purchase different types of ad inventory for different purposes, and one type
does not significantly constrain the pricing of another. For instance, advertisers
primarily purchase search advertising space to implement direct response ad
campaigns, while directly sold ad inventory is generally purchased for brand
advertising campaigns.114

Although the FTC found that all online advertising does not constitute a relevant
antitrust market and suggested that submarkets exist, it is unlikely that courts will
adopt the FTC’s approach when defining the relevant product market for online
advertisers. First, as already discussed, the idea of submarkets has been rejected by
many courts and commentators.115 Additionally, at least one court has rejected the
idea of submarkets in the context of online advertising. In Person v. Google, Inc., the
Northern District of California found that keyword-targeted Internet advertising
(where advertisers pay to have their advertisements placed near the search results
produced by a search engine) was not a relevant product market, and stated:
The Court finds no basis for distinguishing the Search Ad Market from the
larger market for Internet advertising. Search-based advertising is reasonably
interchangeable with other forms of Internet advertising. A website may
choose to advertise via search-based advertising or by posting advertisements
independently of any search. The Search Ad Market thus is too narrow to
form a relevant market for antitrust purposes.116

Furthermore, neither the FTC nor the court in Person considered that courts
could possibly define the relevant market more broadly than just online advertising,
and include traditional methods of advertising such as television, radio, and newspaper
advertising in the relevant product market. Courts have found that different forms of
advertising are substitutes for one another because “[a]ll advertising performs the
same function of introducing and maintaining public awareness of the retailers’

114. Id. at 7.
115. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
116. Person v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-07297 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22499, at *12 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 16, 2007); see also KinderStart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22637, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
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product.”117 In fact, the court in America Online held that various forms of advertising
are substitutes for one form of online advertising—e-mailed advertisements—and
stated that “[t]here are numerous substitutes for e-mail advertising, some of which
are less expensive, including use of the World Wide Web, direct mail, billboards,
television, newspapers, radio, and leaflets, to name a few.”118
Internet advertising does, in fact, perform the same function as the other forms
of more traditional advertising mentioned, and it accomplishes its function in a
similar manner. Content placed on Web sites, such as non-interactive banner
advertisements, is no different than advertisements placed on the page of a newspaper
or magazine, and online video advertisements are no different than television
commercials. Readers of Web sites and newspapers alike will both receive messages
on a page they are viewing in exactly the same manner. For example, if Walt Disney
Co. were to place an advertisement in a newspaper and then place the identical
advertisement on a webpage, the viewer of that advertisement, in either medium,
would receive exactly the same message. Additionally, both Internet and traditional
advertisers use information regarding consumer interests to place their advertising.119
“As they do in other media, [Internet] advertisers wishing to direct their advertising
to customers based on their interests must decide where to place advertising after
determining which websites are popular with the advertisers’ target customers.”120
Indeed, Internet content advertising is functionally interchangeable with other forms
of advertising, even if some “[a]dvertisers view online content providers
differently.”121
Although Internet search advertising (as distinguished from the content
advertising just discussed) differs from more traditional forms of advertising and may
be considered “unique,”122 the former still serves the same function as its more
traditional counterpart. Search advertising provides advertisements to consumers
based on terms they enter into a search engine.123 Google’s AdWords program, for
example, allows advertisers to purchase keywords. When the purchased keyword is
117. Huron Valley Publ’g Co. v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (holding

newspaper advertising does not constitute relevant product market; all forms of advertising must be
considered); see also Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 73 Fed. App’x 576, 583 (4th Cir. 2003)
(holding television, radio, and print advertising to be part of the same relevant market as they “are
competing for the same limited pool of advertisers’ dollars”).

118. Am. Online, Inc. v. GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 858 (E.D. Va. 1999).
119. See, e.g., How does Google target ads to my website?, Google AdSense, http://www.google.com/support/

adsense/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=9713 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010); Ambarish Chandra & Ulrich
Kaiser, Targeted Advertising in Magazine Markets, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1653435 (Aug. 31, 2010); Targeted Advertising, Time Inc., http://www.timeinc.com/clients/
advertising.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (discussing Time Inc.’s targeted advertising divisions for
both magazine and online advertising).

120. FTC Statement, supra note 106, at 3.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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entered as a search term into Google’s search engine by a user, the keyword triggers
the advertiser’s advertisement, and a link to the advertiser’s Web site.124 Based on the
keywords that an advertiser purchases, a search for the term “football,” for example,
may trigger advertisements for replica jerseys or sporting goods stores.125 This is not
entirely different from more traditional forms of advertising. Just as an advertiser
using Google’s AdWords program can choose the keywords that trigger its
advertisement, an advertiser using more traditional forms of advertising can choose
the type of publication that “triggers” its advertisement. For example, a person who
purchases a print copy of TENNIS Magazine will likely “trigger” advertisements for
tennis rackets or tennis pro shops because those advertisers target readers of that
magazine. While this analogy is admittedly an oversimplification of how search
advertising works, it illustrates the point that search advertising serves the same
function as more traditional advertising, and it raises some of the issues that courts
may encounter when defining the relevant antitrust market. Accordingly, the relevant
market definition for online advertising will need to take into account the nonInternet options that advertisers have available to them.
		

2. Retail

Online marketplaces and auction sites such as Amazon.com and eBay sell a
variety of products, including books, electronics, and clothing, to name a few. One
way of defining the relevant market might be the market for online book sales, or
online electronics sales, etc. The problem with these possible definitions is the same
problem associated with defining the advertising market as online advertising—they
are too narrow because they fail to take into account substitutes that are available
from brick-and-mortar sellers. This problem was evident in Gerlinger v. Amazon.com,
Inc., where the Northern District of California observed that the plaintiff was unable
to offer anything but “unsupported allegations that there is a separate and distinct
‘online market segment’” for books.126
Another possible definition is the market for online auctions, in the case of eBay,
or the market for online marketplaces, in the case of Amazon.com. This was the
approach taken by plaintiffs in In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litigation.127 The plaintiffs
in eBay alleged seven antitrust violations, including claims that eBay monopolized or
attempted to monopolize the market for online auctions.128 The plaintiffs, in their
124. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009); see also, Where will my ads appear?,

Google AdWords, https://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6119 (last
visited Sept. 20, 2010).

125. FTC Statement, supra note 106, at 3.
126. Gerlinger v. Amazon.com Inc., 311 F.Supp. 2d 838, 851 (N.D. Cal. 2004). In this case the plaintiff

challenged an agreement between Amazon.com, Inc., an online bookseller, and Borders Group, Inc., a
retail bookseller, and alleged several antitrust violations including illegal price fixing and attempted
monopolization. See id. at 840, 845, 851.

127. 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
128. Id. at 1029.
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complaint, described eBay as a place where “buyers can search for auction listings for
specific items or search by category, key word, seller name, recently commenced
auctions or auctions about to end,” but did not go further in describing the online
auction market.129
The problem with accepting the relevant product market as the online auction
market is that such a definition fails to “acknowledge that alternatives to eBay . . .
exist[,] let alone distinguish [it] from the pool of obvious substitutes.”130 As noted
previously, a wide variety of items are available for sale on eBay, ranging from cars to
electronics to musical instruments.131 A market definition of online auctions fails to
consider that online auctions are not the only place to purchase the items for sale in
eBay’s marketplace, and it also fails to consider that online auctions do not serve as
the only means for buyers and sellers to transact such items.132
After all, long before eBay [and other online marketplaces were] conceived,
buyers and sellers of products ranging from cars to computer equipment to
comic books found ways to complete sales. They gathered together and still
meet through classified ads (both online and off line), car dealerships,
department stores, comic book conventions and everywhere else that people
buy and sell things.133

eBay further elaborated on the possible substitutes to online auctions:

Someone looking, for example, to buy a pair of speakers for a home stereo has
many options. That person might visit a shopping mall, Best Buy or a boutique
home electronics store. A more adventurous (or more informed) buyer might
thumb through classifieds, scan listings on Craigslist.com, type “speakers”
into an Internet search engine, check Amazon.com or visit eBay.com. The
same is true for someone looking to sell speakers. A would-be seller might
post a note on a local bulletin board, host a garage sale, place an ad in a local
newspaper, put a listing on Craigslist.com, list the item on eBay.com or put
the item up for sale somewhere else on the Internet.134

Although the Northern District of California denied eBay’s motion to dismiss, it
did not accept the plaintiffs’ market definition, and it did not define the market at
such an early stage of the litigation. In fact, the court acknowledged that there may
be problems with the plaintiffs’ relevant market definition, stating that the “plaintiffs’
129. Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 9, In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litigation, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1027

(N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-(JF)).

130. Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 9, In re eBay Antitrust Litigation,

545 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-(JF)). This problem is similar to the problem
that results when the product market for online advertising is defined as the online advertising market.
Such a definition fails to consider the brick-and-mortar-substitutes that are available.

131. See eBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2010).
132. See Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 130, at 9.
133. See id.
134. Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint at 3, In re eBay Antitrust Litigation,

545 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (No. C-07-01882-JF).
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market is narrowly defined and may be implausible as a theoretical matter.” 135
However, the court held that at that stage of the litigation the plaintiffs’ allegations
were sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to move forward to prove the relevant market
that they had alleged. 136
Though the court did not dismiss the complaint outright, it seems clear that
there are a variety of functional substitutes to an online auction market that exist
both in brick-and-mortar businesses as well as on the Internet. The narrow market
definition of online auctions does not encompass all of these substitutes, and in
analyzing antitrust claims that arise, courts will need to consider these substitutes
when determining what the relevant market is.
		

3. Social Networking

“Social networking websites allow visitors to create personal profiles containing
text, graphics, and videos, as well as to view profiles of their friends and other users
with similar interests.”137 Unlike online advertising and online marketplaces, social
networking sites do not have readily identifiable substitutes that exist in brick-andmortar businesses. In fact, social networking Web sites are a relatively new concept
and represent a new product that does not exist in brick-and-mortar form. This is in
contrast to online advertising and marketplaces, which are simply new ways of
providing existing products or services. Therefore, when examining the relevant
market for social networking sites (as well as other products or services unique to the
Internet which may already exist, or have yet to be invented) the market definition
will be narrow enough to capture only web-based companies.
This idea of a narrow market definition is illustrated in LiveUniverse, Inc. v.
MySpace, Inc.138 In that case, the plaintiff alleged the relevant product market in
which MySpace operates to be Internet-based social networking.139 On a motion to
dismiss, the Central District of California discussed whether this market definition
was sufficiently alleged and held that it was.140 Although the defendant claimed that
businesses other than social networking Web sites competed in the relevant market,

135. In re eBay Antitrust Litig., 545 F.Supp. 2d 1027, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting Brownlee v. Applied

Biosystems, Inc., No. 88 20672, 1989 WL 53864, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1989)).

136. Id. at 1032–33. On a subsequent motion for summary judgment brought by eBay, the court maintained

that the plaintiffs had raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the online auction market is a viable
relevant market definition. In re eBay, 2010 WL 760433, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2010). The court
nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of eBay because the plaintiffs failed to proffer any
evidence that eBay’s alleged anticompetitive acts actually caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. Id. at *14. This
case, therefore, leaves open the question as to whether the online auction market is a viable relevant
market definition for antitrust purposes.

137. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43739, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *10.
140. Id. at *19.
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there was no argument that brick-and-mortar businesses competed in the relevant
market.141
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the types of brick-and-mortar businesses that
would compete with social networking Web sites. It is even difficult to imagine the
types of Internet businesses that would compete with social networking Web sites.
For example, in response to the defendant’s argument that online dating sites should
be included in the relevant market with social networking sites, the court in
LiveUniverse stated that “[a]lthough social networking web sites may also be used for
dating, if MySpace suddenly were to shut down, its members would not fill the social
void by turning to online dating sites. Instead, they would likely set up profiles on a
different social networking website.”142
Given that there are no readily identifiable functional substitutes for social
networking Web sites, courts will likely continue to define the relevant product
market for these sites in a manner that only includes web-based businesses. Even if
courts conclude that there are substitutes for social networking Web sites, these
substitutes will be unlikely to exist in brick-and-mortar businesses. Therefore, the
relevant market definition for social networking Web sites will still be narrow enough
to include only web-based businesses.
B. Implications

Although companies have emerged that seemingly dominate the Internet and
appear to exercise market power, courts will often define the relevant antitrust market
broadly to include brick-and-mortar competitors that operate and conduct business
beyond the Internet. In a case where the market is defined broadly, a company that
appears to dominate the Internet will not face antitrust liability for alleged
anticompetitive behavior because it does not exercise power in the broader relevant
market.
This is not to suggest that courts will define the relevant market broadly in all
cases involving Internet giants suspected of behaving in an anticompetitive manner.
Only Internet companies that have developed a new product which is exclusive to the
Internet (e.g., social networking sites) will fall into a narrowly defined relevant
market, while companies that have simply developed a new method for delivering
existing products or services (e.g., advertising and retailing companies) will be part of
a broader relevant market. Therefore, companies in the former category will be more
vulnerable to antitrust liability, while the converse will be true for those companies
in the latter category.
V. Conclusion

The Internet has grown immensely from its primitive days as the idea for a “Galactic
Network” and a handful of computers. Its growth and development, especially over
141. Id. at *17–19.
142. Id. at *19.
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the last decade, have led to the emergence of “global gargantuan” firms, the likes of
which were probably unimaginable in the early days of the Internet. These firms, due
to their size, are likely to be at the center of antitrust scrutiny in the future, though
it is not currently clear how courts will define the relevant antitrust market when
cases involving these giants present themselves.
If and when these predicted antitrust cases come before the courts, the relevant
market definition will likely depend upon whether brick-and-mortar substitutes are
available for a given product or service, or whether that product or service is available
from an Internet-based business only. Internet businesses such as advertisers and
retailers will likely fall into the former category and comprise a broadly defined
market, while businesses such as social networking Web sites will likely fall into the
latter category and comprise a narrowly defined market. The implication of these
definitions is two-fold: First, when Internet firms come under antitrust scrutiny,
only firms that fall into the latter category will face antitrust liability. Second, simply
because a firm dominates the Internet does not mean that it dominates the market
for the product that it sells.
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